Violence Prevention Initiative’s
Burundi Peace and Nonviolence Project
First Quarter, 2016 Report

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The year 2015 was marked by an increase of violence in Burundi, but it was also an opportunity for peace activists to step in and start new initiatives. The Genocide Prevention Program (GPP), through the support of an Anonymous Family Foundation, expanded our work on Burundi Peace and Nonviolence project to promote peace and social cohesion among the Burundian people. GPP also joined efforts with the Center for Peacebuilding Leadership, and built upon our existing partnership with Ngozi University (signed in 2014) and the Burundi Peace and Nonviolent Network.

GPP’s earlier efforts focused in the provinces of Ngozi, Gitega and Bururi (see the 2015 Q4 report). The activities conducted through November and December were an expansion of this work, aiming to bring together members of different groups for the purpose of promoting awareness of peace and nonviolence, and training in the use of nonviolent means for resolving conflicts.

Conflict and the dynamics of political violence in Burundian are changing rapidly, and often remain incredibly difficult to understand. In many ways, the conflict and the parties in conflict are constantly evolving. This makes formal conflict resolution very difficult, because the parties in conflict and their demands today will probably look quite different tomorrow. The more groups join the conflict—which has been the case in the last three months—the more complex the crisis becomes. For this reason, the Genocide Prevention Program believes the only way to bring peace in Burundi is to investigate the structural drivers of conflict, and develop programs and partnerships across the country that can address them. Following this assessment of the conflict, the main purpose of GPP’s work in Burundi during the first quarter of calendar year 2016 has been to not only direct peace and nonviolence work, but to engage in deep conversations with key actors to the Burundian conflict residing in Burundi.
One of the surprising finding was that not all political opposition members fled the country (as discussed below, this is a very important discovery because the UN-backed efforts to conduct political dialogue between the government and the opposition is built on an assumption that the political opposition has been forced into de facto exile, to Belgium of Tanzania).

From January through April, the Genocide Prevention Program has engaged the government and international mediators in working on promoting national dialogue in Burundi. Please see GPP’s website, listed above, for updates on this continuing work.
Executive Summary
This report will cover GPP’s activities in Burundi from December 2015 to the end of Q1 2016 (March 2016), and provide a preliminary impact assessment of our work to date. Section 1 provides details about our views of the current crisis, and the perspectives of the Burundian government, the opposition, civil society, and Burundian citizens. Section 2 is addressed to EU and US policy makers. Section 3 discusses GPP’s activities on November 28, 2015—a day that is dedicated, nationally, to promoting Peace and Nonviolence. GPP’s Activities took place in Gitega province, and all GPP’s partner groups from Ngozi, Bururi, Bujumbura and Gitega were invited. Many activities were conducted that day, and several hundred participants attended the events. We would like to provide a special thank you to “Radio Star RM” for broadcasting the information about activities organized by George Mason University in partnership with Ngozi University and the Burundi Peacebuilding and Nonviolence Network.

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Conflict Assessment

In the past six months, following a contested presidential election (in violation of the Arusha peace agreements) and a failed coup attempt, Burundi has suffered a devastating political crisis. Feeling besieged and under attack domestically and internationally, President Nkurunziza and the National Council for the Defense of Democracy party have responded to opposition against the President’s third term by attempting to bolster the president’s position within the party, while consolidating the party’s dominance over the Burundian political landscape. The silencing of opposition media outlets, and human rights abuses against political opponents, are a reality in the Burundian landscape at this moment. But so too are assassination attempts on leading politicians, and attacks against Burundian soldiers and police officers. The cycle of reciprocal political violence has concretized the sentiments on both sides of the conflict, under-cutting the efforts of international mediators and weakening the national dialogue processes. A number of highly respected human rights organizations and international monitors have expressed concerns about the potential for mass atrocities and even genocide in Burundi. While these alarms tend to over-estimate the current level of ethnic polarization in the country, they correctly call attention to the fact that cycles of extreme violence and systematic human rights abuses are forged in moments of crisis when elites from both sides of a conflict mobilize identity (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) in the service of their own narrow interests. Burundi is at this crossroads.

Arusha Accords, social fault lines, and genocide

The danger currently facing the country is not that a genocide will occur tomorrow or later this year, but that people throughout Burundian society will begin to explain their political grievances and economic hardships in terms of belonging—whether ethnic (Hutu v. Tutsi), religious (between Catholic v. Evangelical v. Anglican), regional, or even in generational terms (for example, disaffected youth who are forming so-called self-defense militias think they are supporting a resistance movement against an older generation that has monopolized social and economic opportunities). Currently, political leaders, on both sides of the current crisis, are attempting to activate resentment along these social and identity-based fault lines to convince Burundians to give them support. The problem facing the international community and people working for peace in Burundi is that, at the surface, the current conflict is between supporters of President Nkurunziza and opponents of the President who reject his third presidential term as illegal. Therefore, a dynamic is emerging where leaders are appealing to these identity-based fault lines for support, so they can advance their own narrow political interests. But, at the same time, the people who are joining these movements are not doing joining for these reasons—in fact, in our opinion, most Burundians are not familiar with the nuances of the Arusha Accords (the internationally mediated peace agreement hashed out a decade ago between the warring factions), nor are they overly concerned with the power struggles between the major political parties. Rather, the overwhelming majority of people who are joining these different factions in the conflict are joining because they have very specific grievances stemming from the realities of inequality across the country. These inequalities include the unequal ability of all Burundians to
enjoy basic rights, and a failure to make social, political, and economic opportunities available to all Burundian citizens equally. The danger facing Burundi at this crossroads is that leaders of political factions are encouraging Burundians to think about their grievances in terms of group belonging, in order to mobilize supporters who can help them advance their own narrow political interests.

More than ever, the country of Burundi needs a forum in which people are able to freely and openly discuss their basic needs, and debate potential solutions to their daily problems. Part of this means that Burundi needs open and vibrant political parties that foster national conversations about these basic needs. But the country also needs the social spaces that allow for the Burundian people themselves to engage in a national dialogue that is focused on basic needs, without delving into political gamesmanship.

Rebel attacks
Responsibility for the deteriorating security situation in Burundi, and the overall conflict underscoring the current crises, can be assigned to all parties. Rebel attacks, and attempts to destabilize the government, have been launched against security forces over the past several months. These violent attempts to resist the government and the ruling party are counterproductive, and dangerous. They fuel cycles of reciprocal violence, and the legitimize government crackdowns on all opposition members. Some of the examples include the December attacks from Cibitoke province when a group of rebels attacked Burundi from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That group was defeated by Burundian security forces in less than a week. The government of Burundi however, was accused of using disproportional means to face the enemy. It was also reported that there are some rebels who were killed after they were caught by the national police. What people in the international news media have ignore—and what is very important to remember—is that the police officer who killed the three people after they were arrested is being brought to prosecuted in national courts, and is currently in jail.

After the December attacks, rebel groups began separate recruitment campaigns in January, February, and March. Those groups are currently trying to install themselves in Rwanda, and in some suburbs of the Burundian capital city Bujumbura. On July 10, an attack from Rwanda was successfully stopped by Burundi army. The rebel groups entered Kayanza through Buyumpu, in Kabarore commune. A great deal of small arms weapons and light artillery were confiscated by the army. Similar attacks were observed in Muyinga, Kayanza, Makamba and Bujumbura rural area. It is very important to note that, among all the people arrested during all these attacks, there was not a single Rwandan found to be taking part.

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In terms of military officers who left the army and went to the bush, GPP has determined that General Habarugira Godefroid, the leader of the failed coup, currently had no command at all. His companion, General Cyrille Ndayirukiye, is scheduled to retire in December 2015. After the heavy fight between army forces supporting the coup and those supporting president Nkurunziza Pierre, tensions have actually decreased and the security forces now seem to be solidifying their loyalty around the president. Some attacks are continuing to occur in some suburbs of Bujumbura. These attacks usually involve grenades being thrown occasionally. GPP believes that these attacks are done in order for opposition groups to claim that the government of Burundi is unable to maintain security for all Burundians.

The National Commission for Dialogue
One of the major decisions that the government has under taken is the creation of a National Commission for Dialogue. This National Dialogue processes is occurring at the same time as an international dialogue processes, which is bringing together opposition leaders who fled the country. When the National Dialogue Commission launched its activity, the special envoy of Ugandan President Yoweli Museveni, the Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga, attended the ceremonies.3 The Burundi government was particularly angry at the East African Community’s secretary who announced that president Nkurunziza had no right to run for another term. He also stated that fair and secured elections could not take place in Burundi because there was no peace or freedom of expression. The government of Burundi made it clear that it will participate in Ugandan–led international dialogue, but that they will not engage in any dialogue (national or international) with people who were involved in the failed coup. Along the same line of ideas, the government also made it clear that they will not participate in negotiations, because they claim that there is no strong opposition in Burundi within whom they could negotiate. Those who are fighting have not taken any territory of the country, nor do they accept responsibility for any of the acts of violence they are committing.

Diplomatic missions to Burundi
There are also a number of diplomatic missions to Burundi, representing a number of countries, that are complaining that they cannot meet with the Burundian president. The issue underlying this point of contention is that, from the perspective of the President, if they do not recognize the president is legitimate, then they should not ask to see him. The diplomatic missions of foreign countries are not circulating throughout the entire country, or for that matter, they are not even circulating around the capital city Bujumbura. GPP advises that they should see all the areas of Burundi, and issue public reports on the situation instead of only reporting on what they see on social media such as Twitter, Facebook, What’sApp and others.

One of major issue is that the international community does not want to recognize that President Nkurunziza is still popular in Burundi, and handily won a third term as president even though

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there are election term limits. A majority of Burundian people still like him. He is well supported by all structures of government, from the ministry to local administrative entities (Inama Nshingiro). One of the fears of many in the government is that, when the population becomes upset and frustrated, members of the opposition living in countries such as Rwanda and Brussels may attempt to convince these foreign governments to issue targeted sanctions against Burundian officials. And, if sanctions are not able to reach the officials, attempts may be made to pressure the family members or siblings of government officials.

Finally, the Burundian crisis is not limited to cycles of violence in Burundi. The region of East Africa, on the whole, has a high risk of falling into a regional war. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Kenya have a great deal of material and political interests at stake in Burundian politics, which creates the potential of these countries getting involved in the domestic affairs of Burundi and sending troops to intervene.

**Burundian opposition**

Regarding the opposition, the core objective of the opposition to the government—especially those who took weapons from governments of neighboring countries—is to oust President Pierre Nkurunziza. The chief claim of the opposition is that the Burundian Constitution and the Arusha Accords specifically set term limits (two terms) on the office of the president. According to the opposition, President Nkurunziza has the right to two 5 years terms. This means, under Burundian law and under the terms of the Arusha peace accords, he is allowed to stay in power for a maximum of 10 years. The Burundian constitutional court ruled that President Nkurunziza can legally run for a third term. The government argument upheld by the courts is that the president was not elected by the population for his first term, but rather appointed, and is therefore entitled to a second elected term (which would be his third term in office). However, from the position of the opposition, it does not matter what the Constitution court decided because the constitution and the peace agreement state that the president is limited to two terms.

**GPP interviews with opposition fighters**

In contrast to what the majority of commentators say, and in contrast to the government’s own position, GPP interviews with opposition militants fighting the current regime proved that the armed opposition is very organized. The arguments that the opposition is merely a loose coalition of and uncontrolled rebel groups does not seem true. Indeed, there are some groups that were created during the protest movement which started in April 2015 when President Nkurunziza announced his intention to run for a second term, and then went to Rwanda for military training before coming back to fight from some suburbs of Bujumbura capital city. There are also some groups that are preliminarily operating behind doors. Some of these groups are made of former FNL (National Forces of Liberation) fighters who were not properly demobilized. One of them GPP met with in the Musaga suburb went into the bush in 1992 as an FNL fighter under the leadership of Agathon Rwasa. That was long before the 2003 heavy
fighting between the government of President Pierre Buyoya and CNDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy) and FNL. This conflict was concluded by a peace accord signed in 2006. However, as he says, there was a misunderstanding that caused FNL fighters to go back to the bush until 2008, when demobilization efforts took place. During the demobilization of FNL combatants, only 3,500 were integrated in the national army and police. Another 5,000 fighters were demobilized, and the remaining fighters were told they would be called either to serve in the national army or for other activities if they were needed. The fighter noted that often times the only support fighters got was a radio or pair of tennis shoes. As a consequence, many of the fighters were upset for having risked their lives for nothing other than a radio or tennis shoes. After that failed demobilization, FNL members—including demobilized fighters—have faced selective killings or massacres since 2010. From that time, until now, they went to the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to organize (under the leadership of General Bushuti). There, they were able to arm themselves with the weapons they needed, and started to attack military and police positions in Burundi from DR Congo.

The interviewee asserted that, having come to believe that Agathon Rwasa (the leader of the National Liberation Forces) was no longer caring about them, the fighters decided remove Rwasa from the leadership. The then vice-president, Alfred Bayaga, refused to take over, as did Aimé Magara who was the treasurer of the party at the time. In 2010, the combatants themselves decided to remove general Bushuti—and even removed him from the political party. From that time, the leadership was under general Alloys Nzabampema with his vice-president Paul Abayisenga, a colonel in the army. At that time, the interviewee moved to Rukuko Forest with other combatants, where he still remains. At one point, the interviewee was captured while in DRC and handed to Amunisco, and then transferred to Burundi in 2012. After he was freed, he looked for his troops but they had changed location and he had to use a phone until he found them, while recruiting other youth who could join the movement. Now, as he argues, all the groups have come together and there is one rebellion which is under the leadership of Nzabampema and Godefroid Niyombare. The rebellion consists of members from all ethnic groups from all regions of the country, and includes MSD followers, and FNL fighters. Even “Imbonerakure” members, the youth wing of the ruling party, are joining.
US and EU Involvement in the Crisis
The international community, mainly the European Union and the United States, are intervening in Burundian politics in ways that are likely to radicalized the parties to the conflict instead of bringing parties to the negotiation table. The major global powers that are asserting themselves into the political context of the country lack an understanding of the “subject factors” of the individuals who are joining various rebel and armed groups.

- **Sanctions.** Several statements have been issued by the United States, the European Union, the African Union which impose sanctions on various parties, or recommend what parties should do. The tone of these statements tend to treat Burundian stake holders as children who must obey what parents say. Instead of approaching Burundian stake holders as agents fully capable of understanding their own interests, with equal authority, the United States as well as the European Union give recommendations that are based on their own political interests, not the interests of the Burundian parties to the conflict. The tendency is to assume that US and Western power can force Burundian stake holders to implement what they are told to do.

For this reason, none of the US and EU recommendations are being taken seriously by Burundian stakeholders. They refuse all propositions, and they would prefer to accepted sanctions against key individuals and against the government instead of losing Burundian sovereignty. In our stakeholder interviews with rebel group fighters and leaders, it is clear that the rebel groups treat the US and EU statements with equal opprobrium, and do not view international actors as “allies” against the government in power—even when sanctions are targeting the government.

- **Foreign intervention.** There are deep and longstanding memories of Western interventions into Burundi, and a deep sense of Burundian sovereignty even amongst rebels. More importantly, the rebel groups themselves have told GPP interviewers that they are even ready to fight against whoever would invade their country with the pretext of coming to secure the Burundian people’s security, or to prevent mass atrocities from happening (the interviews were conducted as debates were circulating about whether the African Union would send in peacekeepers to prevent mass atrocities). GPP therefore believes that foreign military intervention into Burundi would cause more violence, and would not be recognized by Burundians as an effort to save innocent lives.

- **Resolve of the current leadership.** Another aspect of the “subject factor” that must be taken into account is the fact that most of the current political leadership across the country are former combatants. They have risen to power, and have “earned” positions within the government bureaucracy, after having fought for more than a decade while
living in the bush. This experience has strengthened their resolve and their sense of solidarity towards each other. But it also means that they are more willing to accept tough conditions in order to maintain their positions within the government, and more willing to turn to armed conflict to fight their opposition.

- **Ethnic conflict.** A core pillar of Arusha Accords is that the Burundian government must maintain “ethnic quotas” in order for the Accords to remain operational. Virtually everyone in Burundi agrees that it is still a good thing to have security forces that are made up of 50 percent Hutu and 50 percent Tutsi. Indeed, one of the major achievements of the past fifteen years has been the success of the Arusha Accords to forge national unity over ethnic divisions. Although the population is divided as approximately 85 percent Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi, the government holds to the principle that 40 percent of government positions should be Tutsi and 60 percent Hutu—at every administrative leadership post in the country. Burundi's leadership has called upon all organizations, national and international, to check and make sure they respect those ethnic quotas, to reflect the make-up of the country's population.

Burundians have distinguished ethnic groups from political and personal interests. Hutus and Tutsi live together in the same villages, and all ethnic groups remain united in daily life. Moreover, all the parties to the conflict have of Hutu and Tutsi members and supporters.

- **Term limits.** GPP’s interviews reveal that people in the countryside do not care about president term limits, or the nuances of constitutional law. They simply demand peace. The people's desire for peace is reflected in how many armed combatants have been caught and denounced by a wide array of average Burundian citizens—as was the case in Muyinga, Kayanza, Cibitoke, Bujumbura, and elsewhere. People across the country who GPP has interviewed care far more about access to fertilizer, seeds, and jobs than they care about term limits. Those who are fighting also do not care, directly, about term limits or the Arusha Accords. Their grievances center around access to economic, social, and political opportunities.

- **Paul Kagame.** The “subject factors” outlined here do not apply to the neighboring countries, nor to the reasons why neighboring countries are seeking to be involved in the current Burundian crisis. While Rwandan President Paul Kagame is considered by the international community as a president who achieved tremendous economic progress for the past decade, he remains the major destabilizing force in the African Great Lakes region beyond Rwanda. There are some sources that say Kagame was involved in the preparation of the killing of Burundian president Melchior Ndadaye in 1993 (as he was seen in Bujumbura, three days before the military coup and met key people in the
preparation of the coup).\textsuperscript{4} Secondly, Rwandan agents have assassinated people (and refugees) in DRC, Burundi, and South Africa, among other places. Kagame was suspected by many sources as being behind the assassination of Burundian intelligence chief Adolphe Nshimirimana in Bujumbura in August. And many sources, including the United Nations, have affirmed that Rwanda is recruiting and arming Burundian rebel groups, and organizing teams to incite ethnic massacre. Courageous analysts denounced the negative role that Rwanda has been playing in the current crisis in Burundi, and forced Kagame to issue public apologies. Hopefully, Rwanda will be pressured to abandon their strategy of inciting violence in Burundi. Other countries also such as Tanzania, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda have major incentives for inciting violence, and therefore can play a major role in stopping current violence. GPP believes that if all the leaders of the region commit themselves to the cause of peace in Burundi, and commit to official and unofficial dialogues with all the parties in conflict in Burundi, then the current conflict can be resolved soon.

GPP Activities & Day of Peace and Nonviolence
The National Day for Peace and Nonviolence in Burundi was held on November 28, 2015. Tensions across the country were much higher in November than they were in July, when GPP held our previous activities. This meant that organizing public activities required more strategic involvement, and more care taken to ensure that we would not incite massive protests, repression against participants, and violence. We also had great difficulty in securing official permission to organize our peace events. We decided to raise awareness and visibility for our sporting events and tournaments, as a way of securing the safety of our participants. To do this, and to generate good will, we decided to organized a march for peace and nonviolence from the University of Gitega to the Commando Playgrounds where the soccer and volleyball tournaments were scheduled to take place.

GPP was able to secure the written permission of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but not without some initial trouble as we had to explain that our events were not a form of protest. The success of our past efforts, and the popularity of our past efforts, were cited as specific reasons why our march for peace and nonviolence was approved. All the work continued smoothly because the Memorandum of Understanding between George Mason University and Ngozi University is valued by Burundi government.

GPP issued communiqués and advertisements over by a regional radio broadcasting, located in Gitega (Radio Star FM). The radio broadcasting informed people of the tournament, and encouraged people who wanted to help support peace and receive nonviolence training to attend. Several hundred participants arrived for the march of peace and the tournaments.

Ngozi and Gitega Universities fielded soccer teams who showed up, wanting to compete for a Peace and Nonviolence Prize.” Bururi and Gitega provinces fielded volleyball teams to also compete for another “Peace and Nonviolence Prize.” Coincidentally, there was a community service event planned at Gitega University for the morning of our march for peace and nonviolence. Several hundred volunteers were at the Gitega University to help build a new building on campus. The people attending our peace and nonviolence events joined the volunteers, and the volunteers later joined our event. The president of the Burundi showed up to the day, and contributed his own manual labor to the community work.

The moderator (over the PA system) repeatedly reminded the entire crowd gathered at the university of the role of the partnership between George Mason University and Ngozi University, as well as the activities that were planned throughout the day in collaboration with Burundi Peacebuilding and Nonviolence Network. The moderator repeated the message to the several hundred people who gathered at the university that peace and nonviolence were the most effective and most needed tools that Burundian people could employ. Given that the President
attended the events, we wanted to show how Burundian people are united and eager to restore peace—even in areas where there is instability.

When the community work was over, people who wanted to attend our Peace and Nonviolence events lined up at the road Rutana-Gitega, and started the Peace and Nonviolence March holding a banner saying “Lancement officielle des activités de promotion de la paix et la nonviolence” (Official kick-off activities for Peace and Nonviolence). The theme for the day stated: “Tous unissons nos forces pour la consolidation de la paix et la nonviolence” (Let’s unite all toward peace and nonviolence consolidation). The march was led by a group of tam-tam drummers, who entertained the marchers and participants all the way to the playground where the games took place.

Photos: The March for Peace and Nonviolence
The soccer tournament was the first to begin. Representatives of George Mason University, Ngozi University, the local government administration, and the Burundi Peacebuilding and Nonviolence Network offered greetings to the players, marking the beginning of the match. After the soccer tournament, the one team moved to the other side and gave a starting signal to volleyball players by sharing the same greetings that were done for them at the beginning of the soccer tournament.
After the tournaments, speeches were given by representatives of the universities and the Vice Governor of Gitega province. After the speeches, it was time to give prizes to the winners. Both of the teams that made it to the final round the tournament were given first and second place prizes. The first team in both Soccer and Volleyball got 150,000 Burundian Francs (about US$90), while the second got 100,000 Burundian Francs. This was done intentionally, as we did not want to create a huge difference in terms of the prizes between the first and the second team. The prizes were handed out by a representative for Gitega Governor.
The final activity was to host a large, communal meal together. Because of the coincidental volunteer building project, most of our participants had been working all day without food. Some of them had been traveling since the morning. It was then time for deep dialogue about peace and nonviolence. Breaking the large group into small groups, we organized small training activities where we encouraged participants to discuss the sources of conflict they encounter in their daily lives. The examples ranged from sibling fights, to interpersonal violence, to conflicts within villages over daily things. There were many participants who also raised the challenges they faced over jobs, employment, and farming as sources of conflict within their communities.
Each of our facilitators led sessions in which the participants were encouraged to discuss strategies for reaching successful outcomes to these challenges, and resolutions to conflicts. All of the facilitators reported that people in their sessions said one of their challenges was to find meaningful and stimulating jobs for young people. This is very important because youth militants are being formed by pro-government and anti-government groups. Instead of creating a master list of recommendations, GPP did not record any of their suggestions. This was done to maintain the trust and anonymity of our participants. It is more important to provide people a forum in which they can undertake local, communal, and national dialogues (such as these Peace and Nonviolence events), than it is to develop a definitive “to do” list of recommendations for international aid and development agencies. Our theory of the conflict in Burundi suggests that the greatest agent for change is not the specific solutions people might arrive at through these sessions. Rather, it is the ability for Burundians to have a space where these kinds of conversations can be encouraged and supported.
Most of the participants were excited and committed to continue working to promote peace and nonviolence in their communities and across the country. Nearly all of the previous participants from our past events in the Summer of 2015 joined this second round of events, in addition to about 100 new participants attracted through our radio broadcasts. Thanks to the coincidental volunteer events, several hundred people joined us and participated in these conversations. We hope that many of these people will continue to be in touch with our Network.

Some recommendations were also given by the provincial administrations, the rectors of both Ngozi and Gitega universities, as well as representatives of Burundi Peacebuilding and Nonviolence Network on how GPP can proceed in future activities.

Finally, we would like to thank the generous support of the Anonymous Family Foundation in supporting the Genocide Prevention Program’s long-term engagement in peace and non-violence work in Burundi.

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Additional Photos from the National Day of Peace and Nonviolence Activities
Organized by GPP